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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Anglo-American law, Krell v. Henry,1 otherwise known as 
the coronation case, is arguably the most important case in the 
development of the law of force majeure and frustration.2 In 1903, 
an English court held that a contract for the leasing of a room to 
watch King Edward VII’s coronation procession was discharged 
when the coronation was cancelled because of the king’s illness.3 
Ever since that case, a contract is discharged under English law if 
the common purpose of the contracting parties is frustrated by a 
supervening event. Fast-forward a century and the doctrine of 
force majeure which developed from the coronation case is playing 
a significant role in resolving contractual disputes resulting from, 
coincidentally, the coronavirus (“COVID-19”) pandemic. Compared 
with most disasters in the world’s history, the COVID-19 pandemic 
is arguably the most international as no countries are immune 
from it. The international character of COVID-19 therefore makes 
private international law an essential component of the force 
majeure analysis. This Article aims to facilitate the understanding 
of the interlocking nature of COVID-19, force majeure, and private 
international law, and seeks to analyze the private international 
 
*Associate Professor, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, S.J.D. (Georgetown), 
LL.M., J.D. (Columbia). This work was generously supported by the Direct Grant for Research 
from the Faculty of Law of The Chinese University of Hong Kong.  
1. Krell v. Henry [1903] 2 K.B. 740 (Eng.). 
2 . Strictly speaking, force majeure is not a common law concept but is used to 
describe clauses that excuse a party from certain specified supervening events. The 
equivalent doctrine under English law is frustration of contract. See Ewan McKendrick, 
Force majeure and Frustration – Their Relationship and A Comparative Assessment, in FORCE 
MAJEURE AND FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT 33 (Ewan McKendrick ed., 2d ed. 1995). However, 
because this Article covers more than just English law and the wide use of force majeure 
commercially, the term force majeure will be used generally to cover frustration as 
appropriate. 
3. See Krell, 2 K.B. 740. 
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law issues that are expected to arise in COVID-19 related force 
majeure cases. As both force majeure and private international law 
are national laws, this Article illustrates the relevant issues by 
comparing both sets of laws between England, the place of origin 
of modern force majeure law and frustration in common law 
jurisdictions, and China, the jurisdiction that has the most 
experience in dealing with force majeure related to coronavirus. 
A. Why is COVID-19 Different From Other Force Majeure Events? 
Four aspects distinguish COVID-19 from other historical force 
majeure events. The first and most obvious aspect is its huge 
economic impact. As of October 4, 2020, there were over 34.8 
million confirmed cases of COVID-19 infection, with the death toll 
reaching more than 1 million.4 According to the latest projection 
by the International Monetary Fund (the “IMF”), global output in 
2020 will contract by 4.9 percent.5 With no end to the pandemic in 
sight, it is not possible to estimate the eventual economic loss at 
this point in time. As the primary function of force majeure is to 
allocate the loss caused by a supervening event between the 
contracting parties,6 the bigger the loss from COVID-19, the more 
important the law on force majeure becomes. 
The second aspect is the strong public interest present in 
COVID-19 related force majeure cases. Insofar as English law is 
concerned, force majeure is meant to do justice to the contracting 
parties.7 As Lord Sumner famously put it, the doctrine is a device 
“by which the rules as to absolute contracts are reconciled with a 
 
4. Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) Weekly Epidemiological Update,  WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION [WHO], (Oct. 4, 2020, 10:00 CEST), https://www.who.int/docs/default-
source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20201005-weekly-epi-update-8.pdf. 
5 . IMF, A Crisis Like No Other, An Uncertain Recovery, World Economic Outlook 
Update, (June 2020), 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/06/24/WEOUpdateJune2020. 
Comparatively, the global financial crisis triggered by the implosion of sub-prime 
mortgages led to only about a 4 percent of contraction in the world’s economy between 
2008 and 2009. See Renae Merle, A guide to the financial crisis — 10 years later, 
WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 11, 2018) (“[i]n all, the Great Recession led to a loss of more than 
$2 trillion in global economic growth, or a drop of nearly 4 percent, between the pre-
recession peak in the second quarter of 2008 and the low hit in the first quarter of 2009, 
according to Moody’s Analytics.”).  
6. See G.H. TREITEL, FRUSTRATION AND FORCE MAJEURE 503 (3d ed. 2014). 
7. See id. at 643-44. 
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special exception which justice demands.”8 However, third parties 
are certainly affected by the resolution of the force majeure issue 
in this pandemic. For example, in Lakeman v. Pollard, the issue was 
whether a defendant could be discharged from working in the 
vicinity of a prevailing epidemic, and the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Maine held that if the performance of contract was rendered 
impossible by the epidemic, the defendant would be discharged.9 
Although the court focused on the impacts that upholding the 
contract would have on the employee,10 the decision can also be 
justified on the basis of public interest “for the reason that the state 
cannot risk the loss of its citizens even to preserve inviolate the 
contracts of individuals.” 11  In other words, upholding the 
employment contract and making the defendant go to work would 
not only put the defendant at risk of contracting the virus, but also 
expose other employees as well as put the public at risk. 
The third aspect relates to the second as such public interests 
rise to a national level in this pandemic. Because of the significant 
negative impacts of COVID-19 on all countries in the world, each 
country has a strong national interest in the law of force majeure. 
This is reflected in various laws passed specifically on force 
majeure by many countries regarding COVID-19,12 as well as other 
COVID-19-related laws like the measures on quarantine and 
lockdowns. 13  Traditionally, as a contractual doctrine, strong 
involvement of the State is alien to the law of force majeure.14 
 
8. Hirji Mulji v. Cheong Yue Steamship Co. Ltd. [1926] A.C. 497, 510 (P.C.). 
9. Lakeman v. Pollard, 43 Me. 463, 467 (1857). 
10. Stating in no uncertain terms, the court made it clear that “[i]f the fulfillment of 
the plaintiff’s contract became impossible by the act of God, the obligation to perform it 
was discharged . . . The plaintiff was under no obligation to imperil his life by remaining at 
work in the vicinity of a prevailing epidemic so dangerous in its character that a man of 
ordinary care and prudence, in the exercise of those qualities, would have been justified in 
leaving by reason of it, nor does it make any difference that the men who remained there 
at work after the plaintiff left were healthy, and continued to be so.” Id. 
11. Contracts – Defenses – Impossibility of Performance, 17 HARV. L. REV. 197, 200 
(1904). 
12. See infra notes 91-101 and accompanying texts. 
13. See, e.g., Interim Measures for the Prevention and Control of Pneumonia Outbreak 
of Novel Coronavirus Infection in Wuhan, NAT’L HEALTH COMM’N OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA (Jan. 29, 2020), 
http://www.nhc.gov.cn/xcs/fkdt/202001/7bde2706a5614338b106362ac161ddaa.shtm
l [https://perma.cc/58RG-XCNZ]. 
14. See supra notes 7 and 8. 
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However, given the severity of COVID-19, the manner in which 
disrupted commercial transactions are handled by force majeure 
may affect the survival of a government. 15  There is thus a 
significant incentive for states to get involved in private 
transactions through the force majeure doctrine to protect their 
national interests. COVID-19 could thus turn the law on loss 
allocation between private parties into the law on loss allocation 
between countries. It is expected that states like China, which has 
a large share of its economy in the hands of state-owned 
enterprises, will have an even stronger incentive than other states 
to shape their force majeure laws in their favor. 
The final aspect is the international nature of COVID-19. The 
global reach of COVID-19 is unprecedented and greatly 
contributed to the scale of the disaster, but the international nature 
goes beyond that. The severity of the pandemic is closely related to 
modern international transportation and commerce through 
which the virus spreads,16 and in turn COVID-19 also causes huge 
disruptions to the same international transportation and 
commerce. 17  Cross-border force majeure issues arising from 
COVID-19 therefore require analysis of private international law. 
B. Why Does Force Majeure From COVID-19 Cause Unique Private 
International Law Issues? 
Force majeure has never attracted much attention from the 
perspective of private international law. For example, in a leading 
textbook written on force majeure and frustration by Professor 
Treitel, only one page discusses private international law, and it 
mostly just refers readers to specialty works like Dicey, Morris & 
 
15. In this sense, COVID-19 imposes threats to the survival of a government much 
like those imposed by wars. See TREITEL, supra note 6, at 348 (“The public policy 
considerations on which the prohibition against trading with the enemy are based are of 
exceptional strength because observance of this prohibition can affect the very survival of 
the nation.”). 
16. See Matteo Chinazzi et al., The effect of travel restrictions on the spread of the 2019 
novel coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak, 368 SCIENCE 395, 395-400 (2020). 
17. Various countries have imposed travel restrictions as a result. For example, Japan 
has imposed a travel ban on foreigners from more than 100 countries. See Border 
enforcement measures to prevent the spread of novel coronavirus (COVID-19), MINISTRY OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN (Aug. 13, 2020), 
https://www.mofa.go.jp/ca/fna/page4e_001053.html [https://perma.cc/53VQ=GZHD]. 
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Collins on The Conflict of Laws. 18  However, Dicey, Morris and 
Collins also have very limited discussions on the topic.19 The lack 
of discussion is a bit surprising considering that international trade 
has long been subject to various kinds of force majeure events, 
though not on the scale of COVID-19. As will be discussed below, 
one explanation is the belief that frustration is just another 
contractual principle that could be handled by the general choice 
of law rules on contracts.20 This may have been correct pre-COVID-
19, but this is no longer true. 
First, as mentioned above, there is a significant national 
interest in force majeure regarding COVID-19. Similar to the law on 
force majeure, private international law has traditionally been 
perceived as a means of achieving justice between private parties, 
not generally for dealing with relationships between countries.21 
The national interests in COVID-19-caused force majeure disputes 
therefore bring new challenges to private international law, 
particularly in public policy and mandatory rules. In addition, the 
increased number of disputes due to COVID-19 also provides 
courts with the opportunity to apply foreign force majeure laws, 
which they had no experience applying. These foreign laws also 
include new COVID-19-specific laws which could serve to widen 
the differences between foreign force majeure laws and those of 
the forum, creating “true conflicts” that had not been seen pre-
COVID-19.22 
 
18 . See TREITEL, supra note 6, at 390 (“[f]or detailed discussion of the relevant 
Conflicts rules [on illegality], reference should be made to the specialist works on that 
subject.”). References were made to DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Lord 
Collins of Mapesbury et al. eds., 15th ed. 2012) and CHESHIRE, NORTH & FAWCETT: PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 42 (J.J. Fawcett & Janeen M. Carruthers eds., 14th ed. 2008). 
19. For example, the term “frustration” appears in the latest edition only twelve 
times. See DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS, supra note 18, at ¶¶ 16-022, 32-026, 32-027, 32-050, 
32-092, 32-124, 32-151, 32-156, 32-162, 34-016, 36-023 (with the word appearing twice 
in this paragraph). 
20. See infra Part III(D); see also McKendrick, supra note 2 (discussing “frustration”). 
21 . See ALEX MILLS, THE CONFLUENCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
JUSTICE, PLURALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERING OF 
PRIVATE LAW 3-10 (2009). 
22. See infra note 24 regarding false conflict generally. 
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C. Why Compare Both the Substantive Laws and Private 
International Laws on Force Majeure? 
Private international law, particularly choice of law rules, is 
closely related to the substantive laws.23 To assess and illustrate 
the impact of COVID-19 on force majeure, this Article will make two 
comparisons between England and China. The first is a comparison 
of the two countries’ substantive force majeure law. The second is 
a comparison of the two countries’ private international law rules 
applied to force majeure issues. While the emphasis of this Article 
is on the second comparison, such a comparison is not possible 
without conducting the first comparison. This is because there will 
be no meaningful need for a choice of law analysis if the 
substantive laws are essentially the same and lead to an identical 
result (in other words, a “false conflict”). 24  However, the first 
comparison will only highlight those key differences with a 
particular significance on the conflict analysis. 
England and China are ideal subjects of comparison. England 
is representative of the common law jurisdictions and serves as a 
striking contrast to the civil law system of China. 25  In addition, 
while England has had a century-long history of force majeure, 
China has more experience dealing with force majeure caused by 
coronaviruses. In 2003, China experienced an epidemic caused by 
another coronavirus, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(“SARS”).26  At the time, the Supreme People’s Court (the “SPC”) 
issued a special judicial interpretation to deal with force majeure 
 
23. See CHESHIRE, NORTH & FAWCETT’S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (Paul Torremans 
eds., 15th ed. 2017) (stating that the function of choice of law is to choose the appropriate 
system of law and not to furnish a direct solution).  
24. See generally Peter K. Westen, False Conflicts, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 74, 76-77 (1967) 
(in particular, the author identified seven different types of false conflicts. The false conflict 
referred to in this article is the second type, i.e. “[c]ases in which the laws of two states, 
though different, yield identical results with respect to the specific issue before the 
court”.). 
25. See John D. Wladis, Common Law and Uncommon Events: The Development of the 
Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance in English Contract Law, 75 GEO. L.J. 1575, 1575-
76 (1987) on the impacts of English law of frustration on US law. 
26. See China’s latest SARS outbreak has been contained, but biosafety concerns remain 
– Update 7, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO], (May 18, 2004), 
https://www.who.int/csr/don/2004_05_18a/en/ [https://perma.cc/8YQS-6NM9]. 
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issues resulting from SARS. 27  Chinese courts also decided a 
number of cases regarding such disputes.28 In 2019, China was also 
the first country to be significantly affected by COVID-19.29 The 
SPC promulgated three judicial interpretations between April and 
June of 2020 which focus on force majeure caused by COVID-19 
(“Guidances”). 30  In terms of the national interests highlighted 
above, China has arguably more substantial national interests than 
 
27. Zuìgāo fǎyuàn: Guānyú zài fángzhì chuánrǎn xìng fēidiǎn xíng fèiyán qíjiān yīfǎ 
zuò hǎo rénmín fǎyuàn xiāngguān shěnpàn zhíxíng gōngzuò de tōngzhī (最高法院：关于
在防治传染性非典型肺炎期间依法做好人民法院相关审判执行工作的通知) [Notice of 
the Supreme People’s Court on Handling of the Trial and Implementation of the People’s 
Court in pursuant to the law during the prevention and treatment of SARS] (promulgated 
by the Sup. People’s Ct., effective June 11, 2003). 
28. See, e.g., Měiguó dōngjiāng lǚyóu jítuán gōngsī (J) yǔ chángjiāng lúnchuán hǎiwài 
lǚyóu zǒng gōngsī chuánbó zūlìn hétóng jiūfēn shàngsù àn  (美国东江旅游集团公司（J）
与长江轮船海外旅游总公司船舶租赁合同纠纷上诉案) [Appeal Case for Ship Leasing 
Contract Disputes between J.PI Travel U.S.A., Inc. and Yangtze River Shipping Overseas 
Tourism Corporation], (Higher People’s Ct. of Hubei Province 2007) (China). 
29 . See Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) Situation report - 1, WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION [WHO] (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.who.int/docs/default-
source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200121-sitrep-1-2019-
ncov.pdf?sfvrsn=20a99c10_4 [https://perma.cc/AQ5K-RVDN]. The Author takes no 
position on the cause or country of origin of COVID-19. 
30. See Zuì gāo rén mín fayuàn yìnfā “guānyú yīfa tuoshàn bànli shè xīnguān fèiyán 
yìqíng zhí xíng ànjiàn ruò gàn wèntí de zhidao yì jiàn” de tōngzhī (Fa fā [2020] 16 hào) (最
⾼⼈民法院印发《关于依法妥善办理涉新冠肺炎疫情执⾏ 案件若⼲问题的指导意⻅》
的通知(法发〔2020〕16 号))[Notice by the Supreme People’s Court on Issuing the 
Guiding Opinions on Several issues Concerning Properly Handling Enforcement Cases 
Involving the COVID-19 Outbreak According to Law, No. 16 [2020]] (promulgated by the 
Sup. People’s Ct., effective May 13, 2020) (“Guidance I”); Zuì gāo rén mín fayuàn yìnfā 
“guānyú yīfa tuoshàn shenli shè xīnguān fèiyán yìqíng minshi ànjiàn ruògān wèntí de zhi 
dao yìjiàn (èr)” de tōngzhī (Fa fā [2020] 17 hào), (最高人民法院印发《关于依法妥善审理 
涉新冠肺炎疫情民事案件若干问题的指  导意见(二)》的通知 (法发〔2020〕17 号
))[Circular of the Supreme People’s Court on the Promulgation of the Guiding Opinions of 
the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning Properly Handling Civil Cases 
Related to COVID-19 Epidemic in Accordance with the Law (II), No. 17 [2020]] 
(promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., effective May 15, 2020) (“Guidance II”); Zuìgāo 
rénmín fayuàn yìnfā “guānyú yīfa tuoshàn shenli shè xīnguān fèiyán yìqíng minshi ànjiàn 
ruògān wèntí de zhi dao yìjiàn (sān)” de tōngzhī (Fa fā [2020] 20 hào) (最高人民法院印发
《关于依法妥善审理涉 新冠肺炎疫情民事案件若干问题的指导意 见(三)》的通知 (法发
〔2020〕20 号)) [Notice by the Supreme People’s Court of Issuing the Guiding Opinions 
on Several Issues of Properly Hearing Civil Cases Involving the COVID-19 Pandemic (III), 
No. 20 [2020]] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., effective June 8, 2020) (“Guidance 
III”). 
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other countries in this pandemic since it has a large number of 
large state-owned enterprises.31  
With respect to the second comparison regarding private 
international law rules as applicable to force majeure issues, 
England follows the European Union’s private international law 
regime, which contrasts in significant ways with the Chinese 
private international law regime.32 The comparison will therefore 
equally apply to a case between China and any EU member state. 
Both countries also have plenty of commercial transactions with 
each other.33 
II. COMPARISON OF FORCE MAJEURE SUBSTANTIVE LAWS   
A. English Law 
In England, the doctrine of frustration can be understood as 
an exception to the doctrine of absolute contracts. Under the latter 
doctrine, a contracting party is required to perform the agreed-
upon bargain even though it has been made impossible by a 
supervening event that is out of its control.34  The landmark case 
that developed the exception of frustration was Taylor v. 
Caldwell.35 In that case, the plaintiff contracted to host concerts at 
the defendant’s music hall which was destroyed by fire before the 
dates of the concerts.36 The English court held that the parties were 
discharged from their respective obligations due to “the 
 
31. See Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and 
the Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L.J. 665, 676-78 (2015). 
32. The Chinese regime seems to be influenced significantly by the EU regime, as 
well. See generally Guangjian Tu, China’s New Conflicts Code: General Issues and Selected 
Topics, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 563 (2011) (comparing the Chinese choice of law regime with 
Rome I Regulation throughout the article). 
33. The United Kingdom (“UK”) was the third largest trading partner of China in 
Europe in 2018. See Total Value of Imports and Exports by Country (Region) of Origin/ 
Destination, NAT’L BUREAU OF STAT. OF CHINA, CHINA STAT. YEARBOOK (2019), 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2019/indexeh.htm [https://perma.cc/9P87-DSL8]. 
China was the UK’s sixth largest export market and fourth largest source of imports in 
2019. See House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper, Statistics on UK trade with China, 
Number 7379 (July 14, 2020), https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-
briefings/cbp-7379/[https://perma.cc/UH4X-XK4X] . 
34. See Paradine v. Jane [1647] Eng. Rep. 82 Aleyn 26. 
35. Taylor v. Caldwell [1863] Rev. Rep. 3 B. & S. 826. 
36. Id. at 826. 
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impossibility of performance arising from the perishing of the 
person or thing.”37   
Krell v. Henry was arguably even more important, as it pushed 
the boundary of the doctrine further than impossibility. 
Frustration will happen if performance of the contract becomes 
impossible “by reason of the non-existence of the state of things 
assumed by both contracting parties as the foundation of the 
contract . . . [in that case,] there will be no breach of the contract . . . 
”38 Impossibility in that case was not necessary. The contract in the 
case could still be performed,  as the plaintiff could rent the room 
to the defendant for the relevant dates.39 The issue was simply that 
the room could no longer be used for the purpose of watching the 
coronation, a purpose that was not written in the contract, but 
understood clearly by both parties.40 
The change in the judicial approach from absolute contracts 
to frustration is reflected in two English cases dealing with 
diseases. Prior to Taylor, in Barker v. Hodgson, 41  despite the 
impossibility of the defendant loading the cargo onto a ship 
chartered by the plaintiff due to a health law implemented due to 
a pestilence that shut down the “public intercourse and 
communication” in the port, the court held that the defendant was 
not discharged by the impossibility.42 The position changed after 
Taylor: in Condor v. The Barron Knights, 43  the court held that 
employee, a talented drummer of a band, was properly discharged 
from the contract due to an illness he suffered. 44  The court 
reasoned that his illness was such “that had in a business sense 
made it impossible for him to continue to perform or for the 
[employer] have him perform the terms of the contract as a 
member of their group.”45 
However, it should be noted that the English courts have long 
accepted, even before Taylor, an exception to the doctrine of 
 
37. Id. at 839. 
38. Krell v. Henry [1903] 2 K.B. 740, 749 (Eng.). 
39. See TREITEL, supra note 6, at 53, 313. 
40. Id.; see also Wladis supra note 25, at 1611. 
41. Barker v. Hodgson [1814] 105 Eng. Rep. 612, 3 M. & S. 267. 
42. Id. at 270. 
43. Condor v. The Barron Knights [1966] 1 W.L.R. 87 (Eng.). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 91. For an American example, see Lakeman v. Pollard 43 Me. 463 (1857). 
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absolute contracts if the supervening event involved illegality.46 
Thus, in Barker v. Hodgson, the court explained that the defendant 
would have been excused if the covenant itself had been prohibited 
by law. 47  This exception has also been extended to cover 
supervening illegality under the law of the place of performance.48 
The lower threshold for illegality may be justified as “the court is 
concerned, not merely with reaching a solution which may do 
justice between the contracting parties, but also with the public 
interest in seeing that the law is observed; and this public interest 
may sometimes outweigh the private interests of the parties.”49 
Even with the breakthrough brought by Krell v. Henry, English 
law has generally adopted a strict approach in discharging 
contracts based on frustration. 50  Notably, it does not have an 
equivalent doctrine of impracticability found under US law.51 In 
the leading American case on impracticability, Mineral Park Land 
Co. v. Howard,52 the defendants, who agreed to extract gravel from 
the plaintiff’s land, did not take the gravel below water level as the 
costs of such extraction would have been ten to twelve times 
higher.53 The Supreme Court of California found the contract to be 
impracticable, saying that “a thing is impossible in legal 
contemplation when it is not practicable; and a thing is 
impracticable when it can only be done at an excessive and 
unreasonable cost.”54 Accordingly, a contract may be discharged 
for impracticability even though it was neither impossible nor was 
its common purpose frustrated. Mineral Park has been widely cited 
in later authorities in the United States. 55  The UCC which 
synthesized the common law development has subsequently 
adopted the use of impracticability instead of impossibility.56 This 
 
46. TREITEL, supra note 6, at 28-30. 
47. Barker, 3 M. & S. at 270. 
48. Ralli Bros v. Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar [1920] 2 K.B. 287 (Eng.). 
49. TREITEL, supra note 6, at 346. 
50. See Wladis, supra note 25, at 1620-29. 
51. See TREITEL, supra note 6, at 274-83. 
52. Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 156 P. 458 (Cal. 1916). 
53. Id. at 459. 
54. Id. at 460. 
55. TREITEL, supra note 6, at 257. 
56. See U.C.C. § 2-615 (Am. L. Inst. & Unif. L. Comm’n 1951). 
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is not an innovation of the UCC as it is observed that US courts do 
not insist on strict impossibility.57 
If a frustration case is established under English law, the 
remedy is the discharge of both parties’ obligations from the time 
of the frustrating event.58 This “all-or-nothing” remedy could be 
harsh, so it was mitigated by the Law Reform (Frustrated 
Contracts) Act 1943, which allows a party to recover a “just sum” 
of expenses in appropriate cases. 59  In short, two important 
functions are served by the frustration doctrine: first, it sets out the 
type of supervening event that could trigger the doctrine; and 
second, it provides for a set remedy in successful cases for proper 
loss distribution. 
English law also allows the parties to change these default 
functions by contract. Parties can by agreement make it easier or 
more difficult to discharge a contract, and can provide for different 
remedies beyond discharge.60 They can include a clause to provide 
for force majeure events, which would not constitute impossibility 
or frustration of common purpose in its absence.61 This is known 
as the force majeure clause under English law.62 Conversely, a party 
may also expressly assume the risk of a force majeure event so that 
its eventual happening will not discharge the obligation and thus 
the liability of the said party.63  These force majeure clauses are 
very common.64 English courts have long accepted that parties will 
include and rely on a force majeure clause.65 As “[u]ncertainty . . . is 
inherent in the doctrine of frustration,”66 it is believed that such 
 
57. E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts 627 (4th ed. 2004). 
58. See Taylor v Caldwell (1863) Rev. Rep. 3 B. & S. 826, 840. 
59. See Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, s. 1(3); see also TREITEL, supra 
note 6, at 602-08. 
60. See TREITEL, supra note 6, at 449. 
61. See id. at 449, 468.  
62. Id.; see also McKendrick, supra note 2, at 34-35. 
63. See Joseph Constantine SS Line Ltd. V. Imperial Smelting Co. Ltd. [1942] AC 154. 
64. See William Swadling, The Judicial Construction of Force Majeure Clauses, in FORCE 
MAJEURE AND FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT 3, 4-5 (Ewan McKendrick ed., 2nd ed. 1995) (“[i]n 
many cases the promisor may be especially unwilling to accept the risk of events over 
which he has no control and a contract may typically provide . . . [for] force majeure 
clauses.”).  
65 . See Paradine v. Jane (1647) Eng. Rep. 82 Aleyn 26 (justifying the absolute 
contracts doctrine “because [the defendant] might have provided against it by his 
contract”). 
66. McKendrick, supra note 2, at 39. 
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clauses could reduce the uncertainty of identifying frustrating 
events.67 Force majeure clauses also afford more flexibility to the 
rigid remedy under frustration. For example, parties often provide 
for extension or adjustment as consideration in the force majeure 
clause.68 Whether these clauses will apply to a given situation will 
be a matter of interpretation by the courts, which has traditionally 
been conducted rather narrowly.69 
B. Chinese Law 
The doctrine of force majeure has existed since 1986 when the 
General Principle of Civil Law (the “GPCL”) was passed.70 It adopts 
the French terminology of force majeure and largely reflects the 
requirements of its French counterparts.71 To qualify for a force 
majeure event, the event must be unforeseeable, unavoidable and 
insurmountable.72 This definition has been adopted by Article 117 
of the Chinese Contract Law (the “CCL”), which was promulgated 
in 1999.73 Perhaps influenced by English law, it is observed that the 
CCL further requires the force majeure event to have frustrated the 
common purpose in order to discharge a contract under Article 
94(1).74 The Chinese law, however, is different from the English 
law in the following aspects: 
 
67. Id. 
68. See TREITEL, supra note 6, at 449; see also Michael Furmston, Drafting of Force 
Majeure Clause – Some General Guidelines, in FORCE MAJEURE AND FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT 
57, 61 (Ewan McKendrick ed., 2nd ed. 1995). 
69. Id. at 476. 
70. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Tongze (中华人民共和国民法通则) [The 
General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by 
President, Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan 1, 1987), arts. 106, 107 and 153 [hereinafter GPCL]; 
see also Lester Ross, Force majeure and Related Doctrines of Excuse in Contract Law of the 
People’s Republic of China, 5 J. CHINESE L. 58, 69-70 (1991). 
71. See Ross, supra note 70, at 68. 
72. See GPCL, at art. 153. For requirements under French law, see Barry Nicholas, 
Force Majeure in French Law, in FORCE MAJEURE AND FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT 24 (Ewan 
McKendrick ed., 2d ed. 1995) (“[i]n order to constitute force majeure an event . . . must 
have been (a) irresistible, (b) unforeseeable, and (c) external to the debtor, and must (d) 
have made performance impossible and not merely more onerous or difficult”). 
73. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hetong Fa (中華人民共和國合同法) [Contract Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by The Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 1999, 
effective Oct. 10, 2001), art. 117 [hereinafter CCL]. 
74. Id. at art. 94(1). 
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1.  Supervening events 
Technically, force majeure under Chinese law is more difficult 
to trigger. As mentioned above,75 unforeseeability is an essential 
component in the finding of a force majeure event. That is not the 
case under English law: 76  that the event “was or ought to be 
foreseen . . . does not prevent it from becoming a frustrating event 
when it occurs; the question . . . is whether the new situation thus 
created is within or outside the scope of the contract on its true 
construction.” 77  Further, unlike English law, the frustration of 
common purpose is not by itself sufficient to discharge a contract. 
It must also be unavoidable and insurmountable, which is a similar 
standard to impossibility in the sense that both prevent discharge 
based on performance becoming more onerous.78 
2. Remedies 
The consequence of force majeure is also different. Under 
English law, the general remedy is discharge, and it is “all-or-
nothing,” meaning that either the whole contract is discharged or 
none of it is.79 Under Chinese law, while discharge can similarly be 
granted under Article 94(1), 80  Article 117 allows the court to 
exempt the relevant party from liability in whole or in part, thus 
providing much more flexibility in the award of remedy.81 
3. Material Change Doctrine 
However, the biggest difference between English and Chinese 
laws lies in the doctrine of “material change” (Qíng shì biàn huà)82 
 
75. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
76. See TREITEL, supra note 6, at 516-17. 
77. Nile Co. for the Export of Agricultural Crops v. H. & J.M. Bennett (Commodities) 
Ltd. [1963] QB 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 555, 582 (Eng.). 
78. See TREITEL, supra note 6, at 284; Nicholas, supra note 72, at 24-25. 
79. See Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, s. 1(2). 
80. See CCL, art. 95. 
81. See CCL, art. 117 (“[a] party who was unable to perform a contract due to force 
majeure is exempted from liability in part or in whole in light of the impact of the event of 
force majeure, except otherwise provided by law.”) (emphasis added). 
82. Adopting the terminology used by the SPC in Huáiběi kuàngyè (jítuán) yǒuxiàn 
zérèn gōngsī yǔ xīnguāng jítuán yǒuxiàn gong sī gǔquán zhuǎnràng jiūfēn èrshěn mínshì 
pànjuéshū (淮北矿业（集团）有限责任公司与新光集团有限公 司股权转让纠纷二审民
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under Article 26 of Interpretation II of the Supreme People’s Court 
of Several Issues Concerning the Application of the Contract Law of 
the People’s Republic of China (“Interpretation II”):83   
“Where any major change which is unforeseeable, is not a 
business risk and is not caused by a force majeure occurs after 
the formation of a contract, if the continuous performance of 
the contract is obviously unfair to the other party or cannot 
realize the purposes of the contract and a party files a request 
for the modification or rescission of the contract with the 
people’s court, the people’s court shall decide whether to 
modify or rescind the contract under the principle of fairness 
and in light of the actualities of the case.” 
This doctrine is by definition not force majeure, as it only 
covers cases falling outside of force majeure. However, it could lead 
to the same remedy, the discharge of the contract.84 For example, 
in Chu Xiang v. Ni Keke Labor Contract Dispute,85 a case very similar 
to Lakeman v. Pollard above, the defendant contracted to serve as 
a translator for the plaintiff in Angola. However, due to the 
outbreak of the Western African Ebola virus epidemic, the 
defendant, worrying about her health, decided not to go to 
Angola.86 The court recognized that the epidemic had introduced 
 
事判决书) [Disputes in the equity transfer between Huaibei Mining (Group) Co., Ltd. and 
Xinguang Group Co., Ltd.], Sup. People’s Ct. Gaz. 387 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2018) (China). 
83. Zuìgāo rénmín fǎyuàn yìnfā “guānyú yīfǎ tuǒshàn shěnlǐ shè xīnguān fèiyán yìqíng 
mínshì ànjiàn ruògān wèntí de zhǐdǎo yìjiàn (èr)” de tōngzhī (最高人民法院印发《关于依
法妥善审理涉新冠肺炎疫情民事案件若干问题的指导意见(二)》的通知) [Interpretation 
of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Concerning Application of the Contract 
Law of the People's Republic of China (II) [2009]] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct. 
Apr. 24, 2009, effective May 13, 2009). Note, however, that the concept of material change 
has been used prior to Judicial Interpretation II. See, e.g., Shànghǎi èr zhōng yuàn shūlǐ 
guānyú 2003 nián-2019 nián gèdì shè yìqíng hétóng jiūfēn 10 dà diǎnxíng ànlì zhī bā: 
Huìzhōu mǒu gōngsī, lián mǒu yǔ guǎngxī mǒu gōngsī zūlìn hétóng jiūfēn àn (上海二中院
梳理关于 2003 年-2019 年各地涉疫情 合同纠纷 10 大典型案例之八：惠州某公司、连某 
与广西某公司租赁合同纠纷案) [Huizhou Air China Auto. Trading Co., Ltd. and Guangxi 
Airlines Co., Ltd. leasing contract dispute appeal], (Higher People’s Ct. of Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region 2007) (dealing with material change arising from SARS). 
84. It is unclear whether discharge under material change still needs to have the 
common purpose frustrated as in the case of discharge under Article 94(1). 
85. Chǔ xiáng sù níkēkē láowù hétóng jiūfēn àn (储翔诉倪珂珂劳务合同纠纷案) [Chu 
Xiang v. Ni Keke Labor Contract Dispute], (People’s Ct. of Xuanwu Dist., Nanjing City, 
Jiangsu Province 2015) (China).  
86. Id. 
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material changes to the employment contract, and discharged the 
parties from the contract accordingly.87 
In this sense, the material change doctrine is very similar to 
the American doctrine of impracticability.88 In fact, the SPC applied 
the doctrine to a case that was very similar to Mineral Park. In 
Chengdu Pengwei Industry Co., Ltd. v. People’s Government of 
Yongxiu County of Jiangxi Province and Office of the Leading Group 
for the Administration of Sand Mining of Poyang Lake of Yongxiu 
County,89 the plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant 
for a mining right to sand at Poyang Lake. However, due to an 
unprecedented low level of water in the lake during the term of the 
contract, the plaintiff only managed to send its ships to mine sand 
for a much shorter period of time than expected.90 The SPC held 
that the low level of water was unforeseeable and thus applied the 
material change doctrine.91 The court did not discuss why it was 
not a force majeure case, but like Mineral Park it appears that the 
mining was still possible despite the low level of water. 92  For 
example, although the judgment did not suggest any alternatives, 
it is possible that the plaintiff could use different types of sand 
carrier or techniques. 
Other than discharge of contract, remedies under the material 
change doctrine include adaptation of contract. Interpretation II 
allows an alternative remedy of adapting the contract based on the 
“principle of fairness.” 93  This does not exist under the US 
 
87. Id. 
88. See Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard 156 P. 458 (Cal. 1916); supra notes 48-50 
and accompanying text. 
89 . Chéngdū péng wěi shíyè yǒuxiàn gōngsī yǔ jiāng xīshěng yǒngxiū xiàn rén 
mínzhèngfǔ, yǒngxiū xiàn póyáng hú cǎi shā guǎnlǐ gōng zuò lǐngdǎo xiǎo zǔ bàngōngshì 
cǎikuàng quán jiūfēn àn (成都鹏伟实业有限公司与江⻄省永修县⼈⺠政府、永修县鄱阳
湖采砂管理⼯作领导⼩组办公室采矿权纠纷案) [Chengdu Pengwei Indus. Co., Ltd. V 
People’s Government of Yongxiu County of Jiangxi Province and Office of the Leading 
Group for the Administration of Sand Mining of Poyang Lake of Yongxiu County], 2010 Sup. 
People’s Ct. Gaz. 4 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2009) (China). 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. In the judgment it was only stated that “the too low water level of Poyang Lake 
made it hard for sand carriers to enter into the mining lots.” It has never been stated that 
the mining was made impossible by the low water level. 
93. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
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impracticability doctrine. 94  It is further distinguished from the 
remedy under Article 117 of CCL, which can only reduce liability of 
the defendant. 95  It does not offer the possibility of upward 
adaptation in favor of the plaintiff.96 In other words, the material 
change doctrine can be used as both the shield and the sword. 
Adaptation was the remedy awarded by the SPC in Chengdu 
Pengwei when it ordered the defendant to return part of the 
consideration paid for the mining right to the plaintiff.97 
This adaptation remedy is not available under English law, but 
has its equivalent under both French and German laws. 98  This 
remedy has been emphatically rejected by English law, as there is 
reluctance to bind parties ex post to a bargain on which they did 
not agree.99 On the other hand, as mentioned above, adaptation 
could be achieved under English law by inserting appropriate 
terms in the force majeure clause ex ante.100 
4. Force Majeure Clause 
Chinese courts apply a stricter interpretation on force majeure 
clauses. On paper, Article 93 of the CCL allows parties to change the 
default force majeure events by making them easier or more 
difficult to satisfy.101 However, a series of SPC cases shows that the 
Chinese courts interpreted such clauses rather narrowly. For 
example, in Chengdu Pengwei, the contract provided specifically 
that “production impossibility and all other risks for water level 
and other objective reasons shall be assumed by [the mining 
company].”102  Yet, the SPC did not address this clause at all in 
reaching its decision. Alternatively, it could be interpreted that the 
 
94. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 57, at 647 (although a similar idea of equitable 
adjustment that gives a court the power to “grant relief on such terms as justice requires” 
has been suggested by the Restatement Second of Contracts § 272, it is not generally 
adopted by the US courts). 
95. See CCL, art. 117. 
96. Id. 
97. 2010 Sup. People’s Ct. Gaz. 4 
98. TRIETEL, supra note 6, at 578-79. 
99. Id. at 580-81. 
100. Id. at 449. 
101. See CCL, art. 93 (“[t]he parties may prescribe a condition under which one party 
is entitled to terminate the contract. Upon satisfaction of the condition for termination of 
the contract, the party with the termination right may terminate the contract.”). 
102. See 2010 Sup. People’s Ct. Gaz. 4. 
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SPC simply found the clause unfair to the plaintiff in the context of 
the material change principle.  
Moreover, drafters of contracts have also tried to expand on 
the default force majeure events, though without much success. In 
Beijing Zehua Chemical Engineering Co., Ltd. v. Chongqing Jianfeng 
Industrial Group Co., Ltd., 103  one of the specified force majeure 
events was “government action or Act of State.” However, the SPC 
thought that the said term should be interpreted in light of the 
default definition of force majeure to avoid uncertainty. 104 
Accordingly, since the government action in question was 
foreseeable, there was no force majeure event.105 
Finally, clauses that seek to narrow the scope of the default 
force majeure events have also failed. In Disputes of House Rental 
Contract Disputes of Hongshan Village Committee of Hongshan 
Street Office of Hongshan People’s Government of Hubei Shuidiao 
Getou Food Culture Development Co., 106  although the clause in 
question only listed “flooding, earthquake or war” as force majeure 
events, the SPC held that an event other than the listed ones could 
still be regarded as a force majeure event so long as it fell within 
the statutory definition.107 In short, while courts in both England 
and China want to reduce uncertainty, their approaches are 
opposite to each other. The negative view of force majeure clauses 
under China’s law contrasts greatly with English law’s positive 
view for reducing uncertainty. The SPC probably considers the 
force majeure clauses unnecessary considering the vast power 
 
103. Běijīng zé huá huàxué gōngchéng yǒuxiàn gōngsī, chóngqìng jiàn fēng gōngyè 
jítuán yǒu xiàn gōngsī jìshù zhuǎnràng hétóng jiūfēn zàishěn mínshì pànjuéshū (北京泽华
化学工程有限公司、重庆建峰工业集团有限公司技术转让合同纠纷再审民事判决书) 
[Beijing Zehua Chem.l Eng’g Co., Ltd. v. Chongqing Jianfeng Indus. Grp. Co., Ltd], Sup. 
People’s Ct. Gaz. 271 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2018) (China). 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106 . Húběi shuǐ diào gē tóu yǐnshí wénhuà fāzhǎn yǒuxiàn gōngsī, wǔhàn shì 
hóngshān qū rénmín zhèngfǔ hóngshān jiē bànshì chù hóng shāncūn cūnmín wěiyuánhuì 
fángwū zū liánbāng hétóng jiūfēn èrshěn mínshì pànjuéshū (湖北水调歌头饮食文化发展
有限公 武汉市洪山 区人民政府洪山街办事处洪山村村民委员会房屋租 联邦合同纠纷二
审民事判决书 ) [Disputes of House Rental Contract Disputes of Hongshan Village 
Committee of Hongshan Street Office of Hongshan People’s Government of Hubei Shuidiao 
Getou Food Culture Development Co], Sup. People’s Ct. Gaz. 107 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2018) 
(China). 
107. Id. 
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afforded under Article 117 and the material change doctrine that 
can be used to discharge or adapt the contract. A similar approach 
is also found in French law in regard to force majeure clauses.108 
5. COVID-19-Specific Law 
China has recently made COVID-19 specific laws to cover force 
majeure in the form of the three Guidances. 109  The Guidances 
mainly provide more detailed applications of the existing laws to 
force majeure cases caused by COVID-19. For example, Article 2 of 
Guidance I refers to the relevant articles in the GPCL and the CCL 
as the applicable legislations on force majeure arising from COVID-
19.110 Article III(2) of Guidance I and Article I(2) of Guidance II 
both provide for the court’s power of adaptation based on the 
principle of fairness regarding certain specified situations. 111 
Despite the absence of any reference to Article 26 of Interpretation 
II, it is clear that the aforementioned articles in Guidances I and II 
are derived from the material change doctrine.112 However, what 
stands out from the Guidances in terms of force majeure is the lack 
of any reference given to force majeure clauses agreed upon 
 
108. See Nicholas supra note 72, at 29. 
109. See Guidance I, Guidance II and Guidance III. 
110. See Guidance I, Art. II. 
111. See Guidance I, Art. III(2)(“[i]f continuing performing the contract makes it 
obviously unfair to one party, and the party requests to change the performance period, 
performance method or price of the contract, the people's court shall, based on actual 
conditions of the case, decide whether to support such a request”); Guidance II, Art I(2) 
(“The negatively affected party’s request to adjust the price shall be supported by the 
peoples courts in accordance with the principle of fairness and the actual situation of each 
case, where the sales contract can be performed continuously but a significant increase in 
the costs of labor, raw materials, logistics and other performance or a significant price 
reduction results from the epidemic or the epidemic prevention and control measures and 
the continuance of the performance of the contract would be obviously unfair to one party. 
A party’s request to change the performance period shall be supported by the peoples 
courts based on the principle of fairness and actual situation of each case, where the sellers 
failure to deliver the goods within the agreed time limit or the buyers failure to pay within 
the agreed time limit results from the epidemic or epidemic prevention and control 
measures.”). 
112. See Binbin Sun & Zhuo Xu, Annotation of Guidance on the Proper Handling of Civil 
Cases Involving the Novel Coronavirus Outbreak in Accordance with the Law (I), ZHONGLUN 
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between the parties. For example, Article I(1) of Guidance II 
provides that if a seller cannot deliver goods as agreed due to 
COVID-19 or related measures and frustrates the buyer’s purpose, 
the buyer is entitled to seek discharge of the contract. 113 However, 
he can only recover the deposit and may not sue the seller for 
breach of liability.114 This rule seems to be in line with Articles 
94(1) and 95 of the CCL. However, what if the contract provides for 
a 90-day suspension for force majeure or the recovery of 
reasonable expenditure in the case of discharge? Will these clauses 
now be overridden by Article 1(1)? The lack of consideration 
regarding force majeure clauses is in line with the SPC’s tendency 
to restrict or ignore the force majeure clauses discussed above. 
There is no equivalent new legislation under English law. 
6. Force Majeure Certificate 
Finally, the China Council for the Promotion of International 
Trade (the “CCPIT”) has recently issued a large number of force 
majeure certificates to contracting parties to certify disruptions 
caused by COVID-19.115 Some countries, such as Russia and Italy, 
also have these force majeure certificate systems. 116  The legal 
status of the CCPIT certificates is, however, uncertain under 
 
113. See Guidance II, Art. I(1)(“The buyer’s request to terminate the contract and 
return advance payment or deposit shall be supported by the peoples courts, if the seller 
fails to complete the order or deliver the goods within the agreed time limit due to the 
epidemic or the epidemic prevention and control measures, and the purpose of the buyer 
cannot be realized by continuance of the performance; while the buyer request that the 
seller shall be liable for breach of contract, such request shall not be supported by the 
peoples courts.”). 
114. Id. 
115 . See Press Release, China Council for the Promotion of Int’l Trade, CCPIT 
Provides COVID-19 Force majeure Certificates and Other Services (Feb. 16, 2020), 
http://www.ccpit.org/Contents/Channel_4324/2020/0216/1240959/content_1240959.
htm [https://perma.cc/N6XJ-TKBY] (having issued more than 4,800 such certificates as of 
March 13, 2020).  
116 . See Ekaterina Pannebaker, Force Majeure Certificates Issued by the Russian 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, CONFLICTOFLAWS.NET (Apr. 17, 2020), 
https://conflictoflaws.net/2020/force-majeure-certificates-by-the-russian-chamber-of-
commerce-and-industry/ [https://perma.cc/H5R2-729S]; see also Guilio Maroncelli & 
Roberta Padula, COVID-19 emergency - Force majeure certificates issued by the Chambers of 
Commerce in Italy, DLA PIPER (Apr. 8, 2020), 
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/hongkong/insights/publications/2020/04/covid-19-
emergency---force-majeure-certificates-issued-by-the-chambers-of-commerce-in-italy/ 
[https://perma.cc./68J7-VRS4].   
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Chinese law. Unlike Russia and Italy, which both have their 
respective Chamber of Commerce to issue the certificate,117  the 
CCPIT is officially composed of civilians, although its Articles of 
Association was said to have been approved by the State Council.118 
These Articles also authorized CCPIT to issue such force majeure 
certificates.119  In Sichuan Borui Vision Outdoor Media Co., Ltd. v. 
Hangzhou Aoxiang Advertising Co., Ltd., a case decided in 2016, the 
contract in question expressly required the party claiming force 
majeure to submit evidence to CCPIT within 15 days of the 
occurrence of the alleged event.120 Since no evidence was provided 
to CCPIT, the court held that the force majeure defense failed.121 
While the case does not discuss the standalone status of the CCPIT 
certificate without the force majeure clause, it does show that the 
CCPIT was handling force majeure matters prior to the COVID-19 
outbreak, and its force majeure certificate could command certain 
respect from the Chinese courts. This suggests that a CCPIT 
certificate may have certain evidentiary value under Chinese law. 
In summary, Chinese force majeure law is substantially 
different from its English counterpart. It is defined particularly by 
the restrictive interpretation of the force majeure clause and the 
vast power of the Chinese courts to adapt the contract. The 
Guidances further widen these differences. As these differences 
may be outcome determinative, they make private international 
law analysis even more important to COVID-19-related force 
majeure cases. 
III. COMPARISON OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
One of the earliest private international law cases involving 
force majeure is Jacobs, Marcus & Co. v. The Crédit Lyonnais. 122 
Decided in 1884, the case presented the English Court of Appeal 
 
117. See, e.g., Pannebaker, supra note 116. 
118. See China Council for the Promotion of Int’l Trade, CCPIT Charter (2015).  
119. Id., Art 8(1). 
120. Sìchuān bó ruì yǎnjiè hùwài zhuàn méi yǒuxiàn gōngsī sù hángzhōu ào xiáng 
guǎnggào yǒu xiàn gōngsī děng gǔquán zhuǎnràng jiūfēn àn (四川博瑞眼界户外传媒有限
公司诉杭州奥翔广告有 限公司等股权转让纠纷案) [Sichuan Borui Vision Outdoor Media 
Co., Ltd. V. Hangzhou Aoxiang Advert. Co., Ltd.], (Chengdu Intermediate People’s Ct., 
Sichuan Province 2017) (China). 
121. Id. 
122. Jacobs, Marcus & Co. v. The Crédit Lyonnais [1884] QB 12 589 (Eng.). 
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with two competing laws, namely force majeure under the French 
Civil Code, which would discharge the contract, and the English law 
of frustration, under which there would be no discharge.123 The 
court stated at the outset that the threshold matter was “whether 
this contract is to be construed according to English law or 
according to French.” 124  Applying the English choice of law 
contract rule, which assumed the law of the place of execution to 
be the proper law of contract, the court held that the law of 
England, where the contract was entered into, was to apply.125 
However, if an English court is to consider the case again under the 
current choice of law rules of the Rome I Regulation of the 
European Union,126 it is possible that the French Civil Code, the law 
of the country where the seller had its habitual residence, could be 
regarded the law of the place with the closest connections.127 In 
that case, French law would apply and force majeure would 
discharge the contract accordingly. This case thus shows the 
importance of the private international law rule to an international 
force majeure dispute. 
The court also discussed whether the French Civil Code could 
still be applied even though the contract was governed by English 
law. While acknowledging that the French Civil Code could be 
incorporated into the contract, the court was of the opinion that it 
should be incorporated by an express term. 128  This once again 
marginalizes the role of the law of the place of performance and 
makes the choice of law issue regarding frustration a simple 
process of identifying the proper law of contract. 
In Rule 150 of Dicey’s A Digest of the Law of England with 
reference to the Conflict of Laws (the first edition of Dicey & Morris 
which was published in 1896), Dicey states that “[t]he validity of 
the discharge of a contract . . . depends upon the proper law of the 
 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 599. 
125. Id. at 602-03. 
126. Council Regulation 593/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6 (EU) [hereinafter Rome I 
Regulation]. 
127. See id. at Art. 4(1)(a); see also infra note 140 and accompanying text. 
128. See Jacobs, QB 12 at 604. 
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contract.”129 This certainly matches with the approach of Jacobs, 
though Professor Dicey did not cite the case in Rule 150. Jacobs was 
eventually cited in the relevant rule in the sixth edition of Dicey & 
Morris (Rule 143) when Professor Otto Kahn-Freund rewrote the 
chapter on contract.130 It was cited to support the position that 
“[t]he proper law ought to determine . . . whether [performance] is 
excused as a result, e.g., of the frustration of the contract.”131 Citing 
Jacobs, Kahn-Freund further stated that in the comment of Sub-
Rule 3 of Rule 136, while the “method and manner” of the 
performance should be regulated by the law of the place of 
performance, frustration, as a matter of “substance of obligation,” 
is governed by the proper law of the contract.132 Although Rule 143 
was edited out of the book since the twelfth edition when the 
editors rewrote the chapter to accommodate the change in the 
choice of law regime resulting from the Rome Convention, the 
comment in Rule 136 remains in the latest edition.133 The simple 
and authoritative treatment of frustration as a matter covered by 
the governing law since such an early stage of the development of 
English conflict of laws partly explains why frustration has not 
attracted much discussion in the context of private international 
law by courts and commentators in common law jurisdictions. 
The position remains the same under the Rome I Regulation 
as stated in a recent case, Canary Wharf (BP4) T1 Ltd. v. European 
Medicines Agency.134 The court held that frustration was governed 
by the proper law of contract under Article 12 of the Rome I 
Regulation, whether by virtue of Article 12(1)(b) regarding 
performance of contract, or Article 12(1)(d) regarding 
extinguishing contract.135 It does not matter in the end, as the same 
law will apply.136 
 
129. ALBERT VENN DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS: WITH NOTES OF AMERICAN CASES 575 (1896); see also GEOFFREY C. CHESHIRE, 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 337 (3rd ed. 1935) (suggesting the same position). 
130. DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS  ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 651-652 (J.H.C. Morris et al. 
eds., 6th ed. 1949). 
131. Id. at 652. 
132. Id. at 601. 
133. See DICEY, MORRIS & COLINS, supra note 18, at ¶ 32-162. 
134. Canary Wharf (BP4) T1 Ltd. V. European Medicines Agency [2019] EWHC (Ch) 
335 (Eng.). 
135. Id. at ¶186. 
136. Id. 
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To identify the proper law of contract under Rome I 
Regulation, Article 3 provides that parties may choose the 
substantive law. 137  This is most commonly done by an express 
choice of law clause in international commercial transactions, as in 
Canary Wharf itself where the parties included a choice of law 
clause in favor of English law.138 As a result, the English rules of 
frustration applied to the force majeure issue in the case.139 In the 
absence of choice, the Rome I Regulation applies the law with the 
closest connections to the contract.140 Article 4 identifies such law 
by using the presumption of characteristic performance subject to 
rebuttal by the law of a country that is manifestly more closely 
connected with the contract.141 
At first glance, the Chinese choice of law regime is very 
similar. Under Articles 3 and 41 of the Law of Choice of Law for 
Foreign-related Civil Relationships (the “Choice of law Act”), 
contracting parties may choose the law applicable to their 
contract.142  This law applies to all issues arising from contract, 
including force majeure. For example, in Appeal Case for Ship 
Leasing Contract Disputes between J.PI Travel U.S.A., Inc. and 
Yangtze River Shipping Overseas Tourism Corporation,143 the Hubei 
High Court held that the force majeure that resulted from SARS 
should be governed by Chinese law, which was designated as the 
applicable law under the express choice of law clause in the 
contract.144 Like Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation, in the absence 
of choice, the law most closely connected with the contract will be 
applied, and is once again guided by characteristic performance.145 
 
137. Rome I Regulation, art. 3. 
138. [2019] EWHC (Ch) 335, at ¶ 179. 
139. Id. 
140. Rome I Regulation, art. 4. 
141. Id. 
142. Decree of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by HU Jintao, President 
of China, Oct. 28, 2010), NO. 36, arts. 3, 41 (China) [hereinafter Choice of Law Act]. 
143. Měiguó dōngjiāng lǚyóu jítuán gōngsī (J) yǔ chángjiāng lúnchuán hǎiwài lǚyóu 
zǒng gōngsī chuánbó zūlìn hétóng jiūfēn shàngsù àn  (美国东江旅游集团公司（J）与长江
轮船海外旅游总公司船舶租赁合同纠纷上诉案) [Appeal Case for Ship Leasing Contract 
Disputes between J.PI Travel U.S.A., Inc. and Yangtze River Shipping Overseas Tourism 
Corporation], (Higher People’s Ct. of Hubei Province 2007) (China). 
144. The case predated the Choice of Law Act, but the choice of law principle is 
substantially the same. 
145. Choice of Law Act, Art. 41. 
2020] FROM CORONATION TO CORONAVIRUS 211 
Force majeure is also clearly characterized as a matter for the 
applicable law of contract under Chinese law, with no article in the 
Choice of Law Act giving any role to the law of the place of 
performance. 
Due to the similarities between the choice of law rules of the 
two countries, it appears that the same substantive law will apply 
regardless of the forum. If this is indeed the case, even if the 
substantive laws on COVID-19-related force majeure are different, 
choice of law rules will theoretically not be outcome 
determinative.146  However, the reality of the interactions of the 
two regimes are much more complicated. This is because of the 
differences in mandatory rule, illegality, procedural laws, judicial 
practice on choice of law, and jurisdiction and enforcement of 
judgments. 
A. Mandatory Rule and Public Policy 
The public and national interests discussed above will prima 
facie be reflected in private international law in the form of 
mandatory rules and public policy. The public interest in COVID-
19 demands analysis in this aspect even if it is not generally 
necessary for a standard force majeure case. 
Article 4 of the Choice of Law Act provides that Chinese 
mandatory law will apply regardless of the applicable foreign 
law.147 Particularly, law on public health is among one of the five 
specific categories of laws identified as being mandatory under the 
SPC interpretation.148 Although most of the decided cases applying 
 
146. TREVOR C. HARTLEY, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGATION 4 (3rd ed. 2020). 
147. Choice of Law Act, art. 4. 
148 . See Zuìgāo rénmín fǎyuàn guānyú shìyòng “zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó 
shèwài mínshì guānxì fǎlǜ shìyòng fǎ” ruògān wèntí de jiěshì (yī) (最高人民法院关于适用
《中华人民共和国涉外民事关系法律适用法》若干问题的解释(一)) [Interpretations of 
the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning Application of the Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on Choice of Law for Foreign-Related Civil Relationships (I)] 
(promulgated by the Judicial Comm. of the Supreme People’s Ct., Dec. 10, 2012, effective 
Jan. 7, 2013), art. 10(2)  [hereinafter Choice of  Law Interpretation I]. 
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Article 4 involved employment149 or financial legislations,150 the 
Guidances clearly fall within the said category. In addition, the 
preamble of Guidance II prominently highlights the significance of 
the socioeconomic impacts of COVID-19 by referring to its purpose 
as furthering “Liu Wen” and “Liu Bao,” which are both economic 
goals of China.151  It is thus arguable that the Guidances may apply 
as mandatory law even if the applicable law identified by Article 41 
is a foreign law.152 
Another way to achieve the same result is to utilize the public 
policy exception under Article 5. This article applies Chinese law if 
the applicable foreign law is prejudicial to the social and public 
interests of China.153 If the application of the English force majeure 
rule is found to be contrary to China’s public interest, the 
Guidances will thus apply instead.154 There is, however, no room 
under the Choice of Law Act for the mandatory rule of foreign law 
to apply if it is not the applicable law. This is because the wording 
of Article 5 only operates negatively, i.e. negating the effect of 
foreign law contrary to Chinese mandatory law, but not positively, 
i.e. negating the effect of Chinese law contrary to foreign 
mandatory law.155  
English law also provides for the application of English 
overriding mandatory law and non-application of foreign law that 
 
149. See, e.g., Yú zhìliáng yǔ wēi mào jīngmì wǔjīn (zhūhǎi) yǒuxiàn gōngsī láodòng 
zhēngyì shàngsù àn (余志良与威茂精密五金（珠海）有限公司劳动争议上诉案) [Yu 
Zhiliang v. Weimao Precision Hardware (Zhuhai) Co., Ltd.], (2017). 
150. See,  e.g., Gāodélóng děng sù nánjīng jīn shà shíyè yǒuxiàn gōngsī gōngsī jièkuǎn 
hétóng jiūfēn àn (高德龙等诉南京金厦实业有限公司公司借款合同纠纷案) [Gao Delong et 
al. v. Nanjing Jinsha Industrial Co., Ltd.], (2014). 
151. For details of “Liu Wen” (stability on the six fronts) and “Liu Bao” (stability on 
the six areas), See Zhang Jianfeng, Chinese premier stresses stabilizing foreign trade, 
investment, CCTV (June 29, 2020), 
https://english.cctv.com/2020/06/29/ARTI3drmj1p5gwPe0NwOAAU8200629.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/RRR7-E34L]. 
152. In this context, it will fall into the catch-all category under Article 10(6) of 
Choice of law Interpretation I. 
153. Most decided cases on Article 5 relate to gambling debt. See, e.g., Luōjīng yǔ 
gǔlìmíng, hánxùyīng mínjiān jièdài jiūfēn yīshěn mínshì pànjuéshū (罗京与谷力鸣、韩旭
英民间借贷纠纷一审民事判决书) [Luo Jing, Gu Liming v. Han Xuying] (2019). 
154. See Choice of Law Act, art. 5 (“[i]f the application of foreign laws will damage the 
social public interests of the People's Republic of China, the laws of the People's Republic 
of China shall apply.”). 
155. Id. 
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is contrary to English public policy under Articles 9(2) and 21, 
respectively.156 In addition, such application is also possible under 
Article 3(3), which provides that where all other elements points 
to a country other than the country whose law has been chosen, 
the chosen law may not prejudice the application non-derogable 
law, namely the provisions of the law of that other country which 
cannot be derogated from by agreement.157 An act that provides 
for remedies in frustration cases like the Law Reform (Frustrated 
Contracts) Act 1943 might thus potentially apply under these 
Articles even if Chinese law is the applicable law. Another potential 
application might be the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, which 
may apply as mandatory law to strike out an unfair force majeure 
clause. 
Unlike Chinese law, however, it is possible for a foreign 
overriding mandatory rule to apply positively even if it is not the 
law the parties chose to the extent that the rule is a non-derogable 
law under Article 3(3). For example, in Banco Santander Totta SA 
v. Companhia de Carris de Ferro de Lisboa SA,158 the English Court 
of Appeal held in obiter that Article 437 of the Portuguese Civil 
Code, which is a force majeure provision of Portuguese law, would 
have been applied under Article 3(3) if all the relevant factors had 
pointed to Portugal.159 Although Lord Justice Longmore cautioned 
that “there is something to be said for the view that a force majeure 
provision of a national law (such as Article 437) is not necessarily 
a provision which is non-derogable within the terms of Article 
3(3),”160 a force majeure law specially passed for the purpose of 
COVID-19, such as the new SPC judicial interpretations, would 
seem to present a strong case as non-derogable law when all the 
factors point to China. 
In short, by comparing the choice of law rules between the 
two countries, it is theoretically possible for each jurisdiction to 
apply the forum’s own mandatory rule even if the other’s law is the 
applicable law. However, in case of the forum law being the 
 
156. Rome I Regulation, arts. 9(2), 21. 
157. Rome I Regulation, art. 3(3). 
158. Banco Santander Totta SA v. Companhia de Carris de Ferro de Lisboa SA [2017] 
EWCA (Civ) 1267, 1 WLR 1323 (Eng.). 
159. Id. at 839. 
160. Id. at 855. 
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applicable law, only England will consider applying the Chinese 
mandatory rule. 
Fortunately, each of the relevant substantive laws relating to 
force majeure has a provision that eliminates these complicated 
applications in both countries. Article 6(1) of Guidance III 
expressly provides that the governing law on force majeure issues 
shall be identified by the rules under the Choice of Law Act.161 This 
clearly indicates that the rules under the Guidances are not 
mandatory rules. In addition, Article 6(3) of Guidance III also 
reminds Chinese judges not to assume that the foreign rules on 
force majeure are the same as their Chinese counterparts, thus 
clearly foreseeing the possibility of applying foreign force majeure 
rules.162 
The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 is even 
more straightforward. Section 1(1) of the Act expressly provides 
that it only applies to English contracts.163 While Morris thought 
the section was redundant, 164  it does eliminate any potential 
uncertainty on the Act’s application as a mandatory rule. For the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, its role as an overriding 
mandatory rule refers only to its overriding effects on parties’ 
freedom to choose the applicable law in applicable cases, 165 
instead of its provision applying directly to international contract. 
Commentators have generally agreed that force majeure clauses 
are not normally subject to the Act in any event.166 This is because 
“a party whose performance is prevented or delayed by 
supervening events [specified in the force majeure clause] is not in 
breach at all.”167 As such, a force majeure clause, by defining the 
party’s duty, is distinguished from an exemption clause which 
 
161. Choice of Law Act, art. 6(3). 
162. Id. 
163. The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943, 6 & 7 Geo. 6, Ch. 40 s 1(1) 
(Eng.). 
164. J. H. C. Morris, The Choice of Law Clause in Statutes, 62 L. Q. REV. 170, 183 (1946) 
(“the words limiting the scope of the Frustrated Contracts Act to ‘contracts governed by 
English law’ are unnecessary and inadequate.”). 
165. See Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, c.50, § 27(2) (Eng.); see also discussions in 
CHESHIRE, NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 23, at 579-81. 
166. See, e.g., TREITEL, supra note 6, at 469-71. 
167. Id. at 469-70. 
2020] FROM CORONATION TO CORONAVIRUS 215 
excludes or limits liability.168 Only the latter is regulated by the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. 
For public policy to reject foreign law, Article 21 of the Rome 
I Regulation has also raised the standard higher than its 
predecessor to “manifestly incompatible,”169 thus making it more 
difficult to apply. While the Chinese rules are substantially 
different from the English rules, there does not seem to be anything 
particularly objectionable to merit rejection by English public 
policy. 
It is also highly unlikely for an English court to apply a Chinese 
mandatory rule through Article 3(3). If Guidance III allows the 
potential application of foreign force majeure law, the Guidances 
are not going to be regarded as non-derogable law either. In any 
event, it would be highly unlikely for Article 3(3) of Rome I 
Regulation to have a chance to apply in the first place. This is 
because the Article would only apply when all factors of the case 
point to a foreign country, except the express choice by the parties. 
Such a case will hardly exist when it comes to Chinese contracts 
since the Choice of Law Act only allow parties to choose a foreign 
law if the contract is foreign-related.170 
In short, even if the public interest in COVID-19 requires an 
analysis of public policy-related rules of private international law, 
as far as Sino-British force majeure laws are concerned, it is highly 
unlikely that they would be applied for public policy reasons. 
B. Illegality 
The public interest in preventing the spread of COVID-19 has 
led countries to make laws on quarantine and lockdowns. In China, 
for example, the Wuhan government promulgated the Interim 
Measures for the Prevention and Control of Pneumonia Outbreak 
of Novel Coronavirus Infection in Wuhan (the “Interim Measures”), 
which provides the Wuhan government the powers to, inter alia, 
declare quarantine orders and suspend work as appropriate.171 
 
168. Id. at 470. 
169. Rome I Regulation, art. 21. 
170. See Choice of Law Act, Art. 2 and Choice of Law Interpretation I, art. 1. 
171 . Wǔhàn shì xīnxíng guānzhuàng bìngdú gǎnrǎn de fèiyán yìqíng fáng kòng 
zhànxíng bànfǎ  (武汉市新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎疫情防控暂行办法) [Interim Measures 
for the Prevention and Control of Pneumonia Outbreak of Novel Coronavirus Infection in 
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The breach of these laws could potentially be a standalone force 
majeure event to a contract, in addition to the existence of the 
underlying pandemic. For example, suppose an international 
supply contract provides for the manufacturing of certain goods in 
a Wuhan plant of a Chinese supplier during a particular period, the 
subsequent imposition of the quarantine law could make the 
operations of the plant in that period illegal.172  In English private 
international law, this raises the issue of illegality.173 
In Ralli Bros v. Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar, the English 
court established the rule that a supervening illegality in the law of 
the place of performance makes a contract unenforceable even if 
the law is not the governing law of the contract.174 There have been 
heated debates on whether the rule is a part of English domestic 
contract law or private international law.175 If it is the former, the 
rule will only apply if English law is the governing law of the 
contract (as in the facts of Ralli Bros), but will not apply when the 
governing law is that of a third country.176 The “prevailing view” is 
that it is an English domestic contract law doctrine.177 
However, if the rule ever had any private international law 
effect, it is now preserved in Article 9(3) of Rome I Regulation. The 
article provides that effect may be given to the overriding 
mandatory provisions of the law of the country where the 
obligations arising out of the contract must be performed or have 
been performed, where such provisions render the performance 
unlawful.178 Thus, the English court has discretion to permit the 
application of an overriding mandatory Chinese provision, even if 
it is neither part of English law (the lex fori) nor the governing law, 
 
Wuhan] (promulgated by Wuhan Headquarters for the Prevention and Control of 
Pneumonia Outbreak of Novel Coronavirus Infection, effective Jan. 29, 2020),  arts. 27, 29. 
172. See id. at art. 43 (providing that the violation of any provision of the Interim 
Measures would be subject to legal liability, though the article is rather vague as to the 
exact consequence). 
173. For a general discussion on illegality, see DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS, supra note 18, 
at ch. 32. 
174. Ralli Bros v Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar [1920] 2 K.B. 287 (Eng.). 
175 . See William Day, Contracts, Illegality and Comity: Ralli Bros Revisited, 79 
CAMBRIDGE L. J. 64, 67-70 (2020). 
176. See DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS, supra note 18, at ¶ 32-097. 
177. Id. at ¶ 32-100. Cf. Day, supra note 175, at 80-87 (arguing that the rule is neither 
a choice of law rule nor part of English contract law, but a public policy rule). 
178. See DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS, supra note 18, at ¶ 32-096. 
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so long as China is the place of performance. On the other hand, if 
the governing law is English law, the Ralli Bros rule would still 
apply.179 The effect in that case is similar to that of Article 9(3) 
except that the English court will not have the aforementioned 
discretion, and must thus make the contract unenforceable.180 
For the purposes of COVID-19 cases, the doctrine of illegality 
will have three impacts. First, even if Chinese law is not the 
governing law, its quarantine law could still render the contract 
unenforceable if it makes the contract illegal. Second, the 
consequence of the application of illegality is different from 
frustration under English law. If there is a supervening illegality, 
the contract is unenforceable, though it is not discharged under 
frustration. 181  The case of Ralli Bros illustrates this distinction. 
Although the contract’s consideration exceeded the maximum 
price of jute allowed under the supervening Spanish law (the law 
of the place of performance) the English court simply held that the 
defendant was not liable to pay more than maximum allowable 
price. 182  It did not discharge the contract. 183  Finally, unlike the 
public policy analysis above, the threshold for illegality is lower. All 
it requires is that the contract is illegal under the law of the place 
of performance, without requiring the court to conduct a difficult 
weighing of the public policy at stake. 
No similar rule is found under Chinese choice of law rules. 
Illegality under English law will only be taken into account if 
English law is the governing law of contract. Article 4 applies solely 
to the mandatory rules of China and Article 5 applies only 
negatively to reject foreign law.184 
C. Procedural Law 
Professor Trevor Hartley argues that the harmonization of the 
choice of law rules will not eliminate the importance of 
 
179. See id. at ¶ 32-097. 
180. See id. ¶ 32-102. 
181. See Day, supra note 175, at 84. 
182. Ralli Bros v. Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar [1920] 2 K.B. 287 (Eng.). 
183. See Day, supra note 175, at 84. 
184. The effect of Article 5 is similar to Article 21 of Rome I Regulation. For further 
details on the negative concept of public policy under Article 21, see CHESHIRE, NORTH & 
FAWCETT, supra note 23, at 752-54; see also Choice of Law Act, Arts. 4, 5.   
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jurisdictional analysis (and thus forum shopping) due to the 
difference in procedural rules.185 In fact, he thinks that “procedure 
is often more important than substantive law in determining the 
outcome of litigation.”186 Under Article 12 of Rome I Regulation, 
procedural issues are governed by the national law of the member 
states.187 For England, this means that most of these procedural 
matters will be governed by the lex fori under the common law.188 
The position is less clear under Chinese law, as there is no specific 
rule under the Choice of Law Act. 189  One commentator has 
recommended to have lex fori governing procedural matters like 
most other countries. 190  Thus, both countries will apply their 
respective procedural laws regardless of the applicable 
substantive law. The applicable foreign remedy which does not 
exist under the forum’s procedural law is relevant to this 
discussion, particularly in the context of English procedural law. 
Since force majeure’s primary function is to allocate losses 
fairly between the parties,191  whether a court is able to offer a 
particular remedy, i.e. the desired loss application, under foreign 
force majeure law is a significant concern to the parties. If the 
remedy is discharge of contract, there will be no issue, as both 
England and China can give that remedy under their own 
procedural law.192 However, as mentioned above, a key difference 
between the two countries on substantive law is the adaptation 
power under the material change doctrine in Chinese law.193 This 
could cause a substantial issue if an English court applies that 
principle, since adaptation is not part of English domestic law. The 
general rule under English law is that the court may not grant a 
 
185. See HARTLEY, supra note 146, at 5-6. 
186. Id. at 6. 
187. Rome I Regulation, Art. 12. 
188. See RICHARD GARNETT, SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
38 (1st ed. 2012). 
189. See, e.g., Guangjian Tu, Private International Law in China 571 (2016). 
190. Id. at 44. 
191. See TREITEL, supra note 6. 
192. See Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) Rev. Rep. 3 B. & S. 826, 840 (Eng.); see also Law 
Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, s. 1(2). For the position of Chinese law, see CCL, 
art. 95. 
193. See supra notes 84-100 and accompanying text. 
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remedy unknown to the lex fori.194 As far as the adaptation power 
is concerned, there are three possibilities: 
(i) To reject both the right and remedy. This is pursuant to 
Phrantzes v. Argenti where the English court refused to compel 
the plaintiff’s father to enter into a dowry contract on the 
plaintiff’s behalf under Greek law as the remedy was not 
available under English procedural law.195 In addition, since 
the remedy is part and parcel of the right, the court decided to 
dismiss the entire case.196 By analogy, it has been commented 
that the vast power of contract variation under the Australian 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (currently Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010)197 would be “perhaps too difficult” to be 
applied by the English courts.198 
(ii) To grant both the right and remedy. Conversely, it is 
possible that the remedy of the adaptation could be made in 
the right case by analogy to domestic remedies under English 
law. For example, this could be achieved by quantum meruit 
where work has been performed by a party after the contract 
is discharged by frustration.199 If that approach succeeds, the 
court would of course also recognize the right. However, it is 
also clear that such a remedy is still substantially different 
from the adaptation power. 
(iii) To grant the right but to apply a domestic remedy. This is 
the approach taken by the Canadian case, Khalij Commercial 
Bank Ltd v. Woods.200 The Ontario Court recognized the debt 
 
194. ADRIAN BRIGGS, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ENGLISH COURTS, 149-50 (1st ed. 
2014). 
195. Phrantzes v. Argenti [1960] 2 QB 19 (Eng.). 
196. Id. For a similar rule in the US, see Conflict of Laws: Application of Foreign 
Remedies, 1961, DUKE L. J. 316-22 (1961). 
197. See Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 87 (2)(b) (Austl.) (allowing the court to 
make “an order varying such a contract or arrangement in such manner as is specified in 
the order and, if the Court thinks fit, declaring the contract or arrangement to have had 
effect as so varied on and after such date before the date on which the order is made as is 
so specified”). 
198. See Adrian Briggs, Conflict of Laws and Commercial Remedies, in COMMERCIAL 
REMEDIES CURRENT ISSUES AND PROBLEMS 271, 275 (Andrew Burrows & Edwin Peel eds., 
2003); see also GARNETT, supra note 188, at 296. 
199. See Société Tunisienne d’Armement v. Sidermar SpA [1960] 2 QB 278 (Eng.); see 
also TREITEL, supra note 6 at 581-82. For an American example, see Lakeman v. Pollard 43 
Me. 463, 467 (1857) (“[i]f [the plaintiff] was prevented by sickness or similar inability he 
may recover for what he did, on a quantum meruit.”). 
200. Khalij Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Woods (1985) 17 O.R. 358 (Can. Ont.). 
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governed by Saudi law but applied the forum’s enforcement 
rule in place of the Saudi enforcement law which gave much 
more discretion to the court than Canadian law did. The court 
distinguished it from Phrantzes v Argenti, by stating that inter 
alia the remedy in that case was not a fixed sum of money and 
that the enforcement powers in practice were not expected to 
be much different.201 
With respect to the adaptation power of the material change 
doctrine, it appears that possibility (iii) is the most likely. 
Adaptation power is not the only remedy under the material 
change doctrine. Discharge is still available.202 Thus, it is unlikely 
that the court would see the remedy of adaptation as integral to the 
contractual right (which is similar to frustration though technically 
different). This is further supported by Banco Santander Totta 
discussed above.203 Article 437 of the Portuguese Civil Code is a 
very similar provision to Article 26 of Interpretation II. 204  Both 
articles provide for adaptation if there is substantial change in case 
of material changes.205 Although the court did not apply Article 437 
in the end, the fact that it thought it could be applied206 suggests 
that the court saw no difficulty in doing so. Further, the claimant 
also sought termination or modification of contract.207 In this light, 
the situation is much closer to Khalij Commercial Bank than 
Phrantzes, and the English court may simply discharge the contract 
when it applies Article 26 of Interpretation II. 
Another procedural law issue is the force majeure certificate 
which concerns proof of foreign law. Part II of this Article 
 
201. Id. 
202. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. 
203. Banco Santander Totta SA v. Companhia de Carris de Ferro de Lisboa SA [2017] 
1 WLR 1323 (Eng.). 
204 . See id. at 1323, 1329 (“Abnormal change in circumstances 1. If the 
circumstances on which the parties based their decision to enter into a contract have 
undergone an abnormal change, the injured party is entitled to termination of the contract 
or to modify it in accordance with principles of equity if fulfilment of that party’s 
obligations under the contract would be a serious breach of the principles of good faith 
and if the abnormal changes do not form part of the risks covered by the contract. 2. If 
termination is requested, the counterparty may oppose by stating that it accepts 
modification of the contract in accordance with the previous paragraph.”). 
205. See Código Civil, art. 437 and Interpretation II, art. 26. 
206. Banco Santander Totta SA v. Companhia de Carris de Ferro de Lisboa SA [2017] 1 
WLR at 1323, 1329 (Eng.). 
207. Id. at 1331. 
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mentioned that the force majeure clause from the CCPIT may have 
some evidentiary value if the governing law is Chinese law. 208 
Although England does not have such a certificate system, it is 
possible that the place of performance could be in a country where 
such certification is available despite the fact that English law is the 
governing law. In Xiamen Jida Trade Development Company v. 
Xiamen Chemical Raw Material Wholesale Co., Ltd., 209 the 
Intermediate People's Court of Xiamen City, Fujian Province 
accepted the force majeure defense, relying on a force majeure 
certificate issued by a Paris trade association which was verified 
by the CCPIT, notwithstanding that the governing law was 
apparently Chinese law.210 This suggests that Chinese courts may 
be more willing to consider force majeure certificates as evidence, 
regardless of the governing law. It must be noted, however, that 
this case was decided in 1995 and might not be representative of 
contemporary judicial practice in China. 
It is difficult to see English courts adopting the same liberal 
position regarding the CCPIT certificate. Under English law, the 
proof of foreign law is a matter of fact to be established by expert 
testimony.211 The English court will not accept the force majeure 
certificate by itself without a foreign law expert presenting and 
interpreting the certificate.212 Even if Chinese law is the applicable 
law, English courts are unlikely to consider a CCPIT certificate as 
conclusive evidence of Chinese law. This was the position taken by 
the US Supreme Court, which rejected the claim that a statement of 
law provided by the PRC Ministry of Commerce should be binding 
on the interpretation of Chinese law in US courts. 213  If the 
governing law is English law, given the difference between the 
substantive laws on force majeure described above, the evidentiary 
value of a certificate provided by a foreign non-governmental 
organization is doubtful. The CCPIT also did not conduct much 
 
208. See supra Part II.   
209. Xiàmén shì jí dá màoyì fāzhǎn gōngsī sù xiàmén huàgōng yuánliào pīfā gōngsī 
fǎnhuán gòuxiāo hétóng dìngjīn àn (厦门市集达贸易发展公司诉厦门化工原料批发公司返
还购销合同定金案) [Xiamen Jida Trade Dev. Co. v. Xiamen Chem. Raw Material Wholesale 
Co., Ltd.], (Interm. People’s Ct. of Fujian Province 1995) (China).  
210. Id. 
211. See DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS, supra note 18, at 318. 
212. See BRIGGS, supra note 194, at 99. 
213. Animal Science Products v. Hebei Welcome, 138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018). 
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investigation beyond reviewing relevant documents submitted by 
one contracting party online.214 
D. Judicial Practice of Choice of Law 
Thus far, the focus has been on the analyses of the more 
technical private international law rules. However, given the 
national interests in COVID-19 cases, there may be a motivation for 
courts to apply choice of law rules in such a way that, aside from 
the technical analysis above, the forum’s substantive law is to be 
applied. This is particularly a possibility for Chinese courts as they 
have long been following a “homeward trend” in applying Chinese 
law. 215  To assess this potential manipulation, the Author 
conducted a survey on choice of law cases of the Chinese courts. 
The Author did not conduct a similar study on English cases due to 
the limited amount of relevant decisions.216 The findings are set 
out below. 
1. Pandemic-Related Force Majeure Cases 
Although China has experience dealing with SARS, there were 
only two reported cases regarding SARS-related force majeure that 
also have an international element: 217  J.PI Travel U.S.A., Inc. v. 
 
214. See Press Office of the General Conference Office Liu Yue, The issue force majeure 
factual proof to help enterprises maintain their legitimate rights and interests, CHINA 
COUNCIL FOR THE PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Feb. 16, 2020), 
http://www.ccpit.org/Contents/Channel_4324/2020/0216/1240959/content_1240959
[https://perma.cc/3MFH-YBPS]. 
215. See, e.g., TANG ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 227-28 
(2016). 
216. Search on Westlaw only identifies four cases that deal with force majeure and 
conflict of laws: Jacobs, Marcus & Co. v The Crédit Lyonnais [1884] 12 QBD 589 (Eng.); 
Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co [1989] QB 728 (Eng.) (holding that the US 
presidential order had not discharged the parties from further performance of the contract 
and therefore the contract had not been frustrated); Canary Wharf (BP4) T1 Ltd. v. 
European Medicines Agency [2019] EWHC (Ch.) 335 (Eng.); Banco Santander Totta SA v. 
Companhia de Carris de Ferro de Lisboa SA [2017] 1 WLR 1323 (Eng.). All of them have 
English law as the governing law. However, the sample size is too small to warrant 
meaningful empirical analysis. 
217. The cases are identified in Lawinfochina by the search terms SARS (“fēi diǎn”), 
foreign-related (“shèwài”), and force majeure (“Bùkěkànglì”). There is no such case in 
England. 
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Yangtze River Shipping Overseas Tourism Corporation; 218  and 
Huizhou Air China Automobile Trading v. Guangxi Airlines. 219  In 
both cases, the Chinese courts applied Chinese law. In the former 
case there was a governing law clause in favor of Chinese law.220 In 
the latter case found Chinese law was the law with the closest 
connections.221 However, despite the fact that these were the most 
relevant cases on coronavirus and force majeure, the sample size is 
too small for meaningful analysis. There is one international case 
that involved another epidemic: the aforementioned Chu Xiang v. 
Ni Keke labor contract dispute.222 However, despite the fact that the 
place of performance of the contract was Angola, thereby making 
the contract a foreign-related contract, the Chinese court simply 
applied Chinese law with no discussion of choice of law.223 This 
shows that Chinese courts do not always conduct choice of law 
analysis even if there is a foreign element. 
2. Force Majeure-Related Cases 
The next batch of cases surveyed consists of force majeure-
related cases with a conflict element. The Author only surveyed 
cases decided after the Choice of Law Act came into effect in 2011 
 
218. Měiguó dōngjiāng lǚyóu jítuán gōngsī (J) yǔ chángjiāng lúnchuán hǎiwài lǚyóu 
zǒng gōngsī chuánbó zūlìn hétóng jiūfēn shàngsù àn  (美国东江旅游集团公司（J）与长江
轮船海外旅游总公司船舶租赁合同纠纷上诉案) [Appeal Case for Ship Leasing Contract 
Disputes between J.PI Travel U.S.A., Inc. and Yangtze River Shipping Overseas Tourism 
Corporation], (Higher People’s Ct. of Hubei Province 2007) (China). 
219. Shànghǎi èr zhōng yuàn shūlǐ guānyú 2003 nián-2019 nián gèdì shè yìqíng 
hétóng jiūfēn 10 dà diǎnxíng ànlì zhī bā: Huìzhōu mǒu gōngsī, lián mǒu yǔ guǎngxī mǒu 
gōngsī zūlìn hétóng jiūfēn àn (上海二中院梳理关于 2003 年-2019 年各地涉疫情 合同纠
纷 10 大典型案例之八:惠州某公司、连某 与广西某公司租赁合同纠纷案) [Huizhou Air 
China Auto. Trading v. Guangxi Airlines], at 1-6 (Shanghai Second Interm. People’s Ct. 
2007). 
220. Měiguó dōngjiāng lǚyóu jítuán gōngsī (J) yǔ chángjiāng lúnchuán hǎiwài lǚyóu 
zǒng gōngsī chuánbó zūlìn hétóng jiūfēn shàngsù àn  (美国东江旅游集团公司（J）与长江
轮船海外旅游总公司船舶租赁合同纠纷上诉案) [Appeal Case for Ship Leasing Contract 
Disputes between J.PI Travel U.S.A., Inc. and Yangtze River Shipping Overseas Tourism 
Corporation], (Higher People’s Ct. of Hubei Province 2007) (China). 
221. The court highlighted only the China-related factors as Chinese courts often do 
in applying the closest connection test. 
222. Chǔ xiáng sù níkēkē láowù hétóng jiūfēn àn (储翔诉倪珂珂劳务合同纠纷案) 
[Chu Xiang v. Ni Keke Labor Contract Dispute], (People’s Ct. of Xuanwu Dist., Nanjing City, 
Jiangsu Province 2015) (China). 
223. Id. 
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to reflect the judicial practice of the current regime. The survey 
identified 45 such cases.224 
Table 1 
 









As shown in Table 1, the Chinese courts did not apply foreign 
law in any foreign-related force majeure case and invariably 
applied Chinese law. This is the case regardless of the choice of law 
approach adopted by the court, as displayed in Table 2. In three of 
the six cases where the parties agreed to apply Chinese law at trial, 
there was an express choice of law clause designating a foreign law 
as the governing law. However, the parties decided to use Chinese 
law at trial instead.225 
 
224. The cases are identified in Lawinfochina by using the following search terms: 
force majeure (“Bùkěkànglì”), “Article 41 of the Choice of law Act” (“Shèwài mínshì shìyòng 
fǎ dì sìshíyī tiáo”) and “Article 117 of CCL” (Zhōngguó hétóng fǎ dì yībǎi yīshíqī tiáo”). 
225.  Kāngkǎi pǔ gǔfèn yǒuxiàn gōngsī yǔ duōyuán huánqiú shuǐwù mó kējì (běijīng) 
yǒuxiàn gōngsī guójì huòwù mǎimài hétóng jiūfēn yīshěn mínshì pànjuéshū (康凯普股份
有限公司与多元环球水务膜科技（北京）有限公司国际货物买卖合同纠纷一审民事判决
书) [Concap Co. v. Duoyuan Glob. Water Membrane Tech. (Beijing) Co.], (Beijing Daxing 
Dist. (Cnty.) People’s Ct. 2016); Duōyuán huánqiú shuǐwù mó kējì (běijīng) yǒuxiàn gōngsī 
yǔ kāngkǎi pǔ gǔfèn yǒuxiàn gōngsī guójì huòwù mǎimài hétóng jiūfēn èrshěn mínshì 
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It must be recognized that none of these cases involved 
diseases or pandemics, so they cannot be evidence that the Chinese 
courts prefer to apply Chinese law in pandemic-related conflict 
cases. They do, however, confirm the homeward trend of the 
Chinese courts generally in force majeure cases. This homeward 
trend is further corroborated by the following survey on the 
general choice of law practice in contract cases by Chinese courts. 
3. Anglo-American Cases in 2018 
Table 3 below identifies 170 contract cases decided by 
Chinese courts in 2018 that have a foreign factor relating to either 







The data shows that Chinese courts applied Chinese law in all 
but two cases (1.2%). This greatly supports the “homeward trend” 
observation. Although it is not the purpose of this Article to analyze 
the reasons for such trend,227 the non-application of foreign law 
can be attributed to the following reasons: first, most sophisticated 
international transactions involving China will opt for 
 
pànjuéshū (多元环球水务膜科技（北京）有限公司与康凯普股份有限公司国际货物买卖
合同纠纷二审民事判决书) [Duoyuan Glob. Water Membrane Tech. (Beijing) Co. v. Concap 
Co.], (Beijing Second Interm. People’s Ct. Mar. 29, 2018); Yúzhuōlóng yǔ zhūhǎi shì jìn hé 
tiān qìng fángdìchǎn kāifā yǒuxiàn gōngsī shāngpǐnfáng xiāoshòu hétóng jiūfēn yīshěn 
mínshì pànjuéshū (余卓隆与珠海市晋和天庆房地产开发有限公司商品房销售合同纠纷一
审民事判决书) [Yu Zhuolong v. Zhuhai Jinhe Tianqing Real Estate Dev. Co.], (Zhuhai 
Hengqin New Dist. People’s Ct. Nov. 30, 2018) (China). 
226. They are identified in lawinfochina by the search terms: contract (“Hétóng”), 
foreign-related (“shèwài”), the United States (“měiguó”), and England (“yīngguó”). 
227. The Author is working on a separate article on this very topic titled An Empirical 
Review of China’s New Choice of law Regime: In Search of Clear Guidelines?. 
Chinese law 
 
US law English law Others Total 
168 
 
2 0 0 170 
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arbitration.228 This leaves only small contract cases to litigation. 
Due to the relatively insignificant size of these contracts, 
contracting parties may not include a choice of law clause, leaving 
these cases to the closest connection test under Article 41 of the 
Choice of Law Act, which is more prone to manipulation (see 
below).229 Even if the parties include a choice of law clause, the size 
of the claim may not justify the expense of hiring a foreign law 
expert to testify on foreign law. When no foreign law is pleaded, 
Chinese law will likely be applied by default. 230  Perhaps more 
importantly, pleading foreign law in China to the satisfaction of the 
Chinese courts has proven to be difficult in practice.231 This could 
cause the foreign parties to not plead foreign law, despite having 
an express choice of law clause designating the foreign law.232 The 
lack of reliance on choice of law clauses is in stark contrast with the 
deference by English courts to the governing law clause, whether 
under common law or the Rome regime. 
Second, in the absence of choice by the parties, unlike the 
detailed balancing exercise on all circumstances of the case by the 
English courts, 233  Chinese courts tend to refer only to China-
related factors in their application of the closest connection test.234 
As a result, the closest connection test under Article 41 always 
points to Chinese law as having the closest connections with the 
contract. 
 
228. MICHAEL J. MOSER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA 2-4 (Michael Moser ed., 2012). 
229. See Choice of Law Act, art. 41.  
230. Choice of Law Interpretation I, art. 17.  
231. See TANG, supra note 215, at 38. 
232. See Kāngkǎi pǔ gǔfèn yǒuxiàn gōngsī yǔ duōyuán huánqiú shuǐwù mó kējì 
(běijīng) yǒuxiàn gōngsī guójì huòwù mǎimài hétóng jiūfēn yīshěn mínshì pànjuéshū (康
凯普股份有限公司与多元环球水务膜科技（北京）有限公司国际货物买卖合同纠纷一审
民事判决书) [Concap Co. v. Duoyuan Glob. Water Membrane Tech. (Beijing) Co.], (Beijing 
Daxing Dist. (Cnty.) People’s Ct. 2016); Duōyuán huánqiú shuǐwù mó kējì (běijīng) yǒuxiàn 
gōngsī yǔ kāngkǎi pǔ gǔfèn yǒuxiàn gōngsī guójì huòwù mǎimài hétóng jiūfēn èrshěn 
mínshì pànjuéshū (多元环球水务膜科技（北京）有限公司与康凯普股份有限公司国际货
物买卖合同纠纷二审民事判决书) [Duoyuan Glob. Water Membrane Tech. (Beijing) Co. v. 
Concap Co.], (Beijing Second Interm. People’s Ct. Mar. 29, 2018); Yúzhuōlóng yǔ zhūhǎi shì 
jìn hé tiān qìng fángdìchǎn kāifā yǒuxiàn gōngsī shāngpǐnfáng xiāoshòu hétóng jiūfēn 
yīshěn mínshì pànjuéshū (余卓隆与珠海市晋和天庆房地产开发有限公司商品房销售合同
纠纷一审民事判决书) [Yu Zhuolong v. Zhuhai Jinhe Tianqing Real Estate Dev. Co.], (Zhuhai 
Hengqin New Dist. People’s Ct. Nov. 30, 2018) (China). 
233. See,  e.g., Jacobs, Marcus & Co. v. The Crédit Lyonnais (1884) 12 QBD 589 (Eng.). 
234. See King Fung Tsang & Jyh-An Lee, Unfriendly Choice of Law in FRAND, 59 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 220, 281-83 (2019)(discussing how Chinese courts cherry picked only Chinese 
related factor in a high profile case relating to FRAND licensing agreement). 
2020] FROM CORONATION TO CORONAVIRUS 227 
In short, because of the long-established practice of Chinese 
courts applying Chinese law, it is unlikely that force majeure cases 
will be any different. In fact, considering the socioeconomic 
interests at stake in COVID-19 cases, it is even more likely that the 
Chinese courts will apply Chinese law to these cases. Thus, 
although the SPC did not officially make the Guidances mandatory, 
the homeward trend in choice of law described above certainly 
makes the Guidances mandatory in Chinese courts without having 
to invoke the relevant mandatory rule doctrine. However, it is 
important to note that the survey above is not suggesting that 
foreign parties are likely to be prejudiced in their chances of 
success in force majeure related cases. The data only suggests that 
Chinese courts prefer their own law (and probably the notion of 
justice embedded in Chinese law) over foreign law when 
adjudicating force majeure cases. Assuming that the Chinese force 
majeure rules best reflect the notion of justice of China, it is one 
way that the national interests of China will be promoted. 
4. Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
Although choice of law seems to be the most important issue 
in the force majeure context, a brief note on jurisdiction and 
enforcement of foreign judgments is also warranted. The 
applicable choice of law rules depend on the country where the 
forum is located.235 This in turn is decided by jurisdictional rules. 
China’s jurisdictional rules are generally extremely broad.236 While 
it recently adopted a new set of forum non conveniens rules, their 
applications are strictly limited to cases which have close to zero 
connections with China. 237  Comparing the English forum non 
 
235. See CHESHIRE, NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 23, at 7. 
236. See TANG, supra note 215, at 59. 
237. See Zuì Gāo Rén Mínfǎyuàn Guānyú Shì Yòng “Zhōnghuá Rén Míngònghéguó 
Mínshì Sùsòng Fǎ” de Jiěshì (最⾼⼈⺠法院关于适⽤《中华⼈⺠共和国⺠事诉讼法》的解
释 ) [Interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court on the Application of the Civil 
Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China Fa Shi [2015] No. 5] (promulgated by the 
Judicial Comm. Sup. People’s Ct., Jan. 30, 2015, effective Feb. 4, 2015) Westlaw China, art. 
532 [hereinafter Application of the Civil Procedure Law]. For forum non conveniens to 
succeed, the case must fulfil the following conditions: (1) forum non conveniens must be 
raised by the defendant; (2) there is no choice of court agreement selecting a Chinese court 
as the competent court; (3) the case is subject to no exclusive jurisdiction of China; (4) the 
case involves no interests of the nation, citizens, legal entities or other organizations in 
China; (5) main facts in dispute in the case has not occurred within China, and the case 
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conveniens regime, it is much more likely for the English courts to 
decline jurisdiction in favor of a foreign forum. 238  This higher 
chance of the assumption of jurisdiction enables Chinese courts to 
apply Chinese law. 
Even if the case is adjudicated in England, and an English court 
applies English law, it does not mean that Chinese force majeure 
law will necessarily be irrelevant. If the English judgment requires 
enforcement in China, it is possible that the judgment’s 
incompatibility with Chinese public policy will result in Chinese 
courts refusing to enforce the judgment. 239  It is theoretically 
possible that the English judgment could be rejected for violating 
the public policy embedded in the Chinese force majeure law. 
However, as discussed above, 240  Guidance III suggests that the 
application of Chinese force majeure law is not mandatory. As such, 
it is difficult to argue that a judgment resulting from an application 
of law different from Chinese force majeure law is a violation of 
Chinese public policy. 
In practice, it is more likely that the enforcement of an English 
judgment will be rejected for lack of reciprocity.241 To date, China 
still does not have a consistent practice of enforcing foreign 
judgments on the basis of reciprocity.242 While there has been at 
least one case of successful recognition of a Chinese judgment in 
England (Spliethoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor BV v. Bank of China 
 
shall not be governed by Chinese law; (6) a foreign court has jurisdiction upon the case 
and would try the case in a more convenient manner. 
238. Under the test developed by the House of Lords in Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. 
Cansulex Ltd., an English court shall normally decline the exercise of jurisdiction if there is 
another available forum that is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than the English 
court to adjudicate the case, the court will normally grant a stay. See Spiliada Maritime 
Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd. [1987] A.C. 460, at 478. 
239. See Zhonghua Renming Minshisusongfa (中华人民共和国民事诉讼法) [Civil 
Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong. June 27, 2017, effective July 1, 2017), at art. 281-82. 
240. See Choice of Law Act, Art. 6(3) and accompanying text. 
241. See King Fung Tsang, Enforcement of Foreign Commercial Judgments in China, 
14 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 262, 281 (2018) (discussing how China did not exercise reciprocity in 
enforcement of English judgment, even though there was precedent of English court 
enforcing Chinese judgment).  
242. Id.  
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Ltd),243 Chinese courts have thus far denied the enforcement of 
English judgments for lack of reciprocity.244   
Comparatively, enforcement of a Chinese judgment in 
England is much easier. As Spliethoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor has 
shown, English law does not require reciprocity for recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgment. 245  The most important 
requirement is that the deciding Chinese court took jurisdiction on 
a basis that is acceptable to the English courts.246 In Spliethoff’s 
Bevrachtingskantoor, the jurisdiction requirement was satisfied as 
the court found the Dutch seller had submitted to the Chinese 
court’s jurisdiction voluntarily.247 
A similar argument may be made on the public policy 
exception under the New York Convention regarding foreign 
arbitral awards.248 However, China has a much better track record 
in terms of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, and it is 
unlikely that the argument will be successful under the New York 
Convention generally.249 
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246. Id. at 684 (“Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws (15th ed, 2012) (at 
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247. Id. at 684-85. 
248. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 
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no different than most countries’ standards for the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments.”). 
249. See Tsang, supra note 241, at 290 tb. 9 (showing that Chinese courts have 
enforced 87 of 118 arbitration awards); see also DICEY, MORRIS & COLINS, supra note 18, at 
580 (advocating the public policy exception to be restricted to only to cases that 
significantly implicate the state’s legitimate interests and concerns). 
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5. An Illustration 
To fully illustrate the impacts of the judicial practices on 
choice of law, as well as jurisdiction and enforcement of judgment, 
an example will be helpful. Suppose there is a supply contract 
between a Chinese supplier in Guangzhou and an English buyer in 
London. The supply was significantly delayed by the pandemic, 
leading to a claim of damages by the buyer, and the raising of a 
force majeure defense by the seller. The results of their dispute 





























a. Litigation in China 
If the litigation is to take place in China, it is highly likely that 
the Chinese court will apply Chinese law due to its “homeward 
trend.”250 This is particularly the case where there is no express 
choice of law clause in the supply agreement. Although there will 
be a higher chance of the application of English law if there is a 
choice of law clause designating English law as the governing law, 
its application by the Chinese courts is uncertain.251 Chinese courts 
are also unlikely to decline jurisdiction, as its rule on forum non 
 
250. See TANG, supra note 215. 
251. See id. at 38 and accompanying text. 
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conveniens is highly stringent. 252  Here, the fact that the case 
involves a Chinese seller is sufficient to defeat a forum non 
convenience claim.253 If the Chinese seller prevails under Chinese 
force majeure law, the resulting Chinese judgment will likely be 
enforced by the English court, since the initiation of the proceeding 
by the English buyer in China will be regarded as a submission to 
the Chinese court’s jurisdiction, thereby satisfying the jurisdiction 
requirement.254 
b. Litigation in England 
Whether the English court will apply English or Chinese law 
in this case depends on the facts of the case. Clearly, if there is a 
choice of law clause, an English court will likely follow the law 
specified in the clause.255 Whether the English court will decline 
jurisdiction under the principle of forum non conveniens also 
depends on the facts. However, even if the English court applies 
English law and does not decline jurisdiction, Chinese courts will 
likely not enforce the resulting judgment due to the lack of 
reciprocity. This is particularly significant if the English buyer 
prevails in the English court and the Chinese buyer has no assets 
in England. In that case, the only alternative for the English buyer 
is to sue the Chinese seller again in China, which will then repeat 
the analysis of scenario (a) above. Thus, the Chinese private 
international law regime will amplify the effects of Chinese force 
majeure law regardless of the forum. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
COVID-19-related force majeure cases cannot be analyzed 
without consideration of private international law, given its 
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difficult if it is the Chinese party who initiated the proceeding. In that case, for jurisdiction 
to be satisfied, the English party must be “present” in China, either through setting up a 
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presence. See Adams v. Cape Indus. PLC [1989] 7 WLUK 355(Eng.). Alternatively, if there 
is a jurisdiction clause designating the Chinese court as a forum, it will apparently be 
sufficient. 
255. Vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. Ltd. [1939] UKPC 7 (Eng.). 
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international nature. These cases brought unprecedented conflict 
issues because of the public and national interests present in 
COVID-19. They trigger those private international law rules 
regarding public policy and mandatory rules that are not usually 
part of the analysis of force majeure cases. Although this Article 
focuses on the interactions of these private international law 
issues between China and England, many of the private 
international law issues this Article highlights will also be present 
in force majeure cases involving other countries. 
In connection with the Sino-British conflict cases, the 
differences in the substantive laws on force majeure make the 
choice of law analysis outcome determinative. In particular, 
although Chinese law does not give the COVID-19-specific 
Guidances the status of a mandatory law, prior judicial practices in 
China suggest that Chinese courts would most likely apply Chinese 
law under the judicial practice of the Chinese courts. The difficulty 
of enforcing English judgments in China discourages litigation in 
England and further reduces the chances of applying English force 
majeure law. Chinese private international law therefore in effect 
maximizes the chance that Chinese force majeure law applies in 
COVID-19-related cases, thereby promoting Chinese national 
interests. These national interests perhaps always exist in the 
background of private international law, though COVID-19 
probably brings them out more prominently. It will be interesting 
to see if future COVID-19 force majeure litigation will manifest 
these national interests. 
Hopefully, the analysis set out in the Article will help parties 
of international contract anticipate conflict issues and resolve their 
disputes efficiently. The greater wish of the Author, however, is for 
this pandemic to end by the time of the publication of this Article 
and for our world to return to normal. 
